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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
Book Reviews
EL PLAN DE EsTuDIo DE ABOGACIA, by Carlos Cossio. Buenos Aires: L. J.
Rosso, 1933. Pp. 130.
To a North American law student the argument of this little book would
seem strange, for it contends for a policy in law education just the opposite
of the one that we find active in this country. After tracing the history of
law teaching and law curricula in Argentina from their beginnings in 1822,
the author summarizes the present practice and proposes a radical depar-
ture. In Argentina the purpose of training in law has been much more
nearly the aim we have in teaching the social sciences-to train political
and administrative leaders of the nation. In fact, the law school of Buenos
Aires has been almost a major department of the Argentine government.
The instruction has included political science, history, sociology, economics,
and the philosophy of law. In a word, it has been, as the author says,
encyclopaedic and socially pragmatic. The practical training of attorneys
has suffered in comparison with the training of men of public affairs. The
author proposes that all this should be changed and that technical training
in the law and in its practice should become the chief, almost the exclusive,
function of law schools; these latter should turn out well-equipped lawyers
rather than politicians and future statesmen. But he would retain courses
in the philosophy of law. His proposed revised law curriculum would read
as follows: (1) General Science of Law, (2) Gnosology and Metaphysics,
(3) Elements of Positive Law, (4) Fundamentals of Constitutional Law,
(5) Ethics and Esthetics, (6) Real Property, (7) Penal Law, (8) Obliga-
tions, (9 Criminal Procedure and Judicial Organization, (10) Philosophy
of Law, (11) Contracts I, (12) Taxation, (13) Civil Procedure, (14)
Marine Law, (15) Philosophy of History and Social Philosophy, (16) Con-
tracts II, (17) Public Services, (18) Family Law, (19) Private Interna-
tional Law. The two aims of the course would be practical and humanistic.
In addition to regular technical courses he would have the school conduct
(1) practice work (now largely neglected) and (2) seminars on the finding
and use of the law. While we are moving in the direction of a greater
socialization and broadening of the law curriculum, Argentina is agitating
for greater technical efficiency.
L. L. BERNARD.
Washington University.
LA REVOLUCI6N Y LA INTEGRACI6N DE LA TEORIA PURA DEL DERECHO. By
Ca'los Cossio. Buenos Aires: Imprenta de la Universidad, 1935. Pp. 41.
The professor of the Philosophy of Law in the national university of La
Plata, stimulated by constitutional problems growing out of recent Argen-
tine revolutions, raises the question of the legality of revolutionary govern-
ments and of the sanctions necessary to render them legal. As an adherent
of the nen-Kantian school of legal philosophy, he takes his point of depar-
Washington University Open Scholarship
BOOK REVIEWS
ture from the viewpoints of del Vecchio and Kelsen, but proceeds inde-
pendently to the conclusion that anything short of a total revolution leaves
the institutions of the country nominally under the tutelage of the existing
fundamental laws, but actually the processes of revolution tend, like any
other events, to create a variant and hypothetical unwritten constitution
which serves as the real fundamental law until the old constitution is
amended through the ordinary legal channels. The new political regime
may be legitimated either by international recognition (the normal method,
since international sanctions are of a higher order of rational, if not of
constituted, authority) or by national sanction, through the valuntary ad-
justment of other continuing institutions (including the courts and the
constitution) to the newly developing unwritten constitution. Thus, in real-
ity, the author views revolution merely as a normal, though unusual and
non-parliamentary, method of revising constitutions and of changing the
order and personnel of governments. That his views will not receive unani-
mous approval goes without saying, but his viewpoint seems to be growing.
L. L. BERNARD.
Washington University.
RoaER B. TANEY. By Carl Brent Swisher. The Macmillan Company.
New York, 1935. Pp. x, 608.
Successively, each invalidation by the Supreme Court of the more bold
of the New Deal measures has been branded, by the more indignant of the
critics of the Court as "another Dred Scott decision." Current controversy
relative to the practicability of the American doctrine of judicial supremacy
is more heated now than at any time since that decision and such generally
related decisions as Ableman v. Booth and Ex Parte Merryman aroused in
the North a profound antagonism towards and distrust in the Supreme
Court. Historically, the parallel is striking. Mr. Roosevelt's opinion that
the Schechter decision returned the nation to the "horse and buggy age" is
quite comparable to President Lincoln's statement, in his inaugural address,
that if the policy of the government upon vital questions is to be irrevocably
fixed by the Supreme Court, "the people will have ceased to be their own
rulers, having to that extent practically resigned their government into the
hands of that eminent tribunal."
Similarly one need not draw the long bow in comparison to detect a
clear resemblance between Horace Greeley's statement that the Dred Scott
decision was entitled only to the weight to be given to the judgment of the
congregation in any Washington barroom and Secretary Wallace's condem-
nation of the Supreme Court's order for the return of the impounded
processing taxes as "a steal." History has indeed repeated itself. No more
opportune time for the appearance of a really satisfactory biography of
the most criticized judge in American history could well be conceived.
The worth of Roger Brooke Taney as a politician and as a judge has
been wholly reestimated by modern historians. Associated as he was with
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the traditions of the South, remembered primarily for only two features
of his long career, the struggle over the United States Bank, and the Dred
Scott and related decisions, Taney was long accepted as deserving of the
estimate with which Charles Sumner welcomed his demise:-
"The name of Taney is to be hooted down the page of history.
Judgment is beginning now; and an emancipated country will fasten
upon him the stigma which he deserves. . . He administered justice
at last wickedly and degraded the judiciary of the country, and de-
graded the age."
In the perspective of the years, Taney appears a wholly different figure.
Re-analysis of his career and achievements has been thorough. Claude
Bowers, writing from his usual Jacksonian bias, nevertheless stated a good
case in his Party Battles of the Jackson Period, in refutation of the view
long accepted by such leading historians as Bassett and Channing that
Taney was the mere "pliant instrument" of Andrew Jackson in the latter's
supposed vengeful struggle against Nicholas Biddle and his Bank of the
United States. Perhaps typical of modern treatment of Taney is the state-
ment of Charles Warren in his masterful Supreme Court in United States
History: "In the calm light of history it is now seen that the attacks upon
Taney on political grounds had little reasonable basis." Such books as
Daniel Webster, by Claude M. Fuess, have adopted a similar viewpoint as
to Taney's political conduct and judicial achievement.
As the result of the research of historians writing long enough after the
event to have lost most of the prejudice held towards Taney, his real
achievements are well-rcognized. It was most fitting that Chief Justice
Charles Evans Hughes, in 1931, should have paid this tribute to his illus-
trious judicial ancestor:
"With the passing of the years and the softening of old asperities,
the arduous service nobly rendered by Roger Brooke Taney has re-
ceived its fitting recognition. He bore his wounds with the fortitude
of an invincible spirit. He was a great Chief Justice."
Mr. Swisher has written a scholarly biography, which Taney's historical
importance has long called for. The first and "authorized" biography of
the great Chief Justice, by Samuel Tyler, was so consciously laudatory as
to deserve the characterization of a contemporary reviewer that it was "a
panegyric rather than a biography." Bernard C. Steiner's Life of Roger
B. Taney, published in 1922, is faulty in that it lacks true analysis of the
part which Taney's decisions during his long period of service, played in
reshaping the doctrines of American constitutional law. Mr. Swisher has
written a friendly biography, but one which presents Taney's decision and
political activities in the strong light of their consequence in American con-
stitutional law and history.
The early chapters of Mr. Swisher's biography give enough of Taney's
background and early political activity to enable the reader to appreciate
the influences which affected Taney throughout his political and judicial
career. The democratic sympathies which led him from his early Federalist
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position to an understanding of and cooperation with the Jacksonians are
clearly presented.
In his treatment of the Bank War, Mr. Swisher has used much of that
critical discrimination which lends distinction to the process of research.
In the light of the evidence, Taney appears, not the "pliant instrument,"
currying the favor of the vengeful Jackson, but a man who had profound
convictions, traceable to his agrarian background and sympathies, against
the concentration of economic power in the rising mercantile class, towards
whom Taney had a fundamental distrust. Moreover, in the operations inci-
dent to the removal of the deposits from Biddle's Bank and the re-depositing
of them in the state banks, Taney, as Secretary of the Treasury, appears
to have acted with discernment, tact, and fortitude.
As the successor of the mighty Marshall, Taney was faced with the
necessity of participating in and influencing the decision of cases of great
formative influence in American constitutional law. Marshall's interpreta-
tion of the constitution had written into the fundamental law the ideology
of the propertied class. Although his decisions are famed as the basis for a
strong Federal government of wide powers, the great majority of Marshall's
classic decisions had merely decided that the States lacked the power to
pass legislation adverse to the interests of property. The point needs no
elaboration: Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, Gibbons v. Ogden, Dartmouth
College v. Woodward, and cases of that type are all cases of the limitation
of State power to affect adversely the security of property. Taney's deci-
sions, written from a different point of view in which distrust of the mer-
cantile interest was dominant, considerably re-directed the current of con-
stitutional interpretation.
Mr. Swisher classifies the decisions of the Court during Chief Justice
Taney's long service, into three groups. The first group involve the con-
struction of the rights of corporations, whether corporate charters should
be interpreted broadly or limited to the express grants contained in their
provisions. Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, in which "the godlike
Daniel" met with defeat for the first time in seeking to impress his eco-
nomic ideas upon the court, sufficiently indicates the narrow interpretation
which the Supreme Court, under Taney's leadership, gave consistently to
corporate charters. Story's dissent, in that case, seems now the lament of
one who realized that the old order had changed.
The second group into which the author classifies the decisions of the
period is with reference to the commerce clause of the Constitution. Here
the leading case of Cooley v. Board of Wardens of Philadelphia, established
as a principle the formula of Mr. Justice Curtis that in essentially local
matters, the States might legislate on interstate or foreign commerce, until
Congress exercised its prerogative and provided regulation. Although the
decisions throughout Taney's Chief Justiceship remained in a state of con-
siderable confusion as to the interpretation of the commerce clause, the
decisions show a marked change of attitude from the decisions of the
Marshall-dominated Court, prohibiting State action of any kind in matters
of interstate and foreign commerce.
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The third group of decisions deals with property in its connection with
slavery. The limited space proper to a book review prohibits more than a
suggestion of the treatment which Mr. Swisher has made. Taney, naturally,
possessed the Southern bias upon the issue of slavery. Although kind in
his personal relationships towards the oppressed Negro race, as shown by
his early manumission of his own slaves, the attitude of the Chief Justice
held no sympathy for abolitionist method or objective. Always he was
tender of the "peculiar institution" of the South. Suspected rightly of
possessing slave-holding prejudices, Taney met an intolerable opposition
during the last years of his life. His despairing effort in the Dred Scott
case to avert civil strife by writing a comprehensive opinion, broader than
the facts demanded, which might settle once and for all the controversies
between North and South, merely inflamed the old animosities and drew
upon the head of the ageing Chief Justice the hatred and distrust of the
North. Everywhere in the North, Taney was misquoted as having said
that the Negro possessed no rights which the white man need respect.
Finally, after seeking to minimize the harshness of military rule during
the early years of the Rebellion by upholding the power of habeas corpus,
Taney met the concentrated execration of the North.
Nevertheless, the old Justice stuck with his post, dying in harness in
1864. Few in the North were fair to his memory. The Seward comment,
quoted above, indicates the nature of his obituaries. Unhonored he went
to his grave, considered by all in the North as the most subtle of traitors.
It has remained for contemporary historians to reappraise the career of a
truly great Chief Justice. This able biography is by far the most fitting




Vol. 21, p. 40, footnote 21 should read as follows: Supra, note 1. What
appears as footnote 21 should be 22; footnote 22 should be 23, etc.
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